In today’s Globe, Harvard profs Harry Lewis and Fred Abernathy take a public stand against the Secret Seven—the Harvard Corporation.

IF AN ORDINARY corporation had the kind of fiscal year Harvard University just had, some of its directors would be gone. Long-term investments down $11 billion; another $1.8 billion lost by top management speculating with cash accounts; another half-billion gone in an untimely exit from a debt rate gambit. The institution left so illiquid that it was forced to sell assets and issue bonds at the worst possible time, just to pay the bills. A publicly held company would have experienced a shareholder rebellion - especially after the Globe reported that the chief investment officer had repeatedly warned the president about the risks he was taking with the institution’s cash.

But the Harvard Corporation is legally answerable to no one….

Lewis and Abernathy take readers through the origins of Harvard’s fiscal disaster (and make no mistake, it is a disaster): the massive spending increases, the assumption that the endowment would always enjoy double-digit increases, the move to deficit spending, enormous expansion commitments, the lack of a “Plan B”—what to do if optimistic economic projections didn’t pan out.

We all know the consequence: a diminution of Harvard’s excellence.

And while taking an oblique shot at Larry Summers here and there, Lewis and Abernathy keep their eyes on the prize: the Secret Seven, appointed in secret, working in secret, in ways that no public board of directors would be allowed to operate.

The Harvard Corporation is a dangerous anachronism. It failed its most basic fiduciary and moral responsibilities. Some of its members should resign. But the Corporation’s problems are also structural. It is too small, too closed, and too secretive to be intensely self-critical, as any responsible board must be. Until the board can be restructured, the fellows should voluntarily share their power with the overseers. And Harvard should reveal the risks of its business plans, as would be required if it were a publicly held corporation. That exercise in transparency would surely serve Harvard well.

Kudos to professors Abernathy and Lewis for engaging in the type of honest, candid discussion about institutional flaws and challenges that is all too rare at Harvard.

Now that someone has dragged the 800-pound gorilla into the public square, the question becomes: What happens next?

And how, I wonder, will the Corporation respond?